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his own ideas and to his sensible experiences, and who should yet *not* take its content as a true account of reality? The *matter* of the true is thus absolutely identical with the matter of the satisfactory. You may put either word first in your ways of talking; but leave out that whole notion of *satisfactory leading* (which is the essence of my pragmatistic account) and call truth a static logical relation, independent even of *possible* leadings or satisfactions, and it seems to me you cut all ground from under you.

I fear that I am still very obscure. But I respectfully implore those who reject my doctrine because they can make nothing of my stumbling language, to tell us in their own name—*und zwar* very concretely and articulately!—just how the real, genuine and absolutely 'objective' truth which they believe in so profoundly, is constituted and established. They mustn't point to the 'reality' itself, for truth is only our subjective relation to realities. What is the nominal essence of this relation, its definition, whether or not it be 'objectively' attainable by mortals?

Whatever they may say it is, I have the firmest faith that my account will prove to have allowed for it and included it by anticipation, as one possible case in the total mixture of cases. There is, in short, no *room* for any grade or sort of truth outside of the framework of the pragmatic system, outside of that jungle of empirical leading and their nearer or ulterior terminations, of which I seem to have written so unskillfully.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

*Contemporary Criticism of Friedrich Nietzsche.*¹

It is almost impossible to get an unbiased opinion of Nietzsche. A recent and valuable article by Professor Raoul Richter in the supplement to the Munich *Allgemeine Zeitung*² gives a very sympathetic study of the philosopher. From another point of view, Professor D. Julius Kaftan has written an essay entitled 'Aus der Werkstatt des Uebermenschen.' This has the date 1906. In a book by Emil Mauerhof, 1907, there is a study of considerably over two hundred pages with the title 'Was also sprach Zarathustra?' which is as pessimistic as Professor Richter's article is enthusiastic.

Professor Richter deals with Nietzsche chiefly as a constructive thinker. The prevailing fashion has been to consider the philosopher

¹ A review of Richter's 'Friedrich Nietzsche und die Kultur unserer Zeit,' Kaftan's 'Aus der Werkstatt des Uebermenschen' and Mauerhof's 'Was also sprach Zarathustra?'

² No. 223, 1906.

almost solely as an intellectual anarchist, and as having contributed very little that is positive. Richter does not accept this point of view. After dealing in a general way with his relation to art and literature, with the more or less fashionable vogue that he is at present enjoying, with his effect upon contemporary German taste, the critic divides his essay into three parts.

First, Nietzsche's relation to religion. Richter is very much put to it to make of his hero anything but a destructive power in the field of religion, but he attacks his task bravely. He passes lightly over such a book as his 'Antichrist' and over the blasphemous title of his unpublished autobiography, 'Ecce Homo!' He claims that Nietzsche's annihilating criticisms of Christianity were merely attempts to clear the ground for purer spiritual conceptions, that he was a remarkably religious individual and, finally, that the influence of his work and of his personality is only now beginning to bear fruit.

The essayist claims that the substance of religion has nothing to do with dogmas nor with an historical church, but that it is an inner spiritual condition. Nietzsche makes man's religious aspirations entirely independent of the theories of the church—even independent of a Deity. In all this discussion Richter is compelled to take refuge behind philosophical phrases which seem very pregnant, but which really have little significance. Having explained and attempted to justify the formlessness of Nietzsche's beliefs, he considers the question of the content of his religious principles. Nietzsche denies that this world is the well-planned work of a Creator. According to him, it is a tremendous play of forces which recur from eternity to eternity. The whole inorganic nature, earth, air, water, sun and moon, as well as plants, animals and man, is an embodiment of the 'will for power' (*der Wille zur Macht*), and the world process consists in the eternal struggle of individual wills. The man of to-day does not represent the highest point in the organization of nature. Beyond him are possible higher forms—supermen. Instead of a Deity, Nietzsche sets up life as something to be worshipped and glorified. 'That force and fullness increase in the world, that we consciously do that towards which unconsciously everything drives us,' is one of the chief principles of his creed.

Richter thinks that there is a large body of thoughtful men who for a long time have desired just such ethical principles to guide their lives as the philosopher supplies. He finds that there is a general revolution against dogmas, and that Nietzsche's teachings are helping to supply the place made vacant by this upheaval, and further, that one of the greatest achievements of the philosopher consists in his having awakened slumbering religious forces which have been dormant in the skeptical and indifferent. He believes that Nietzsche has revealed to us the possibility of a religion without any of the ideas usually connected with churchly doctrines. He has preached faith, dealing solely with life this side the grave, and has exalted existence in this world in that he has shown the pernicious effects of the church in laying the emphasis upon the rewards

of a future life instead of valuing and improving and developing the present. Nietzsche has given back to the world its good conscience in that he has taken away from us the fear of punishment. In other words, the philosopher supplies something that is in perfect consonance with the demands of the modern man. His beliefs are no longer the gropings of elementary religious instincts, but just as the church has been necessary for the preliminary stages of development, so some such teachings as Nietzsche supplies are needed by the mentally full-grown man of to-day.

The second part of Richter's essay deals with the philosopher's attitude towards ethics. The most common expression used in connection with this phase of Nietzsche's work is his 'unmorality.' He is neither moral nor immoral. Such expressions as 'Beyond Good and Evil,' 'The Twilight of the False Gods or How One Philosophizes with the Hammer' indicate the philosopher's position with regard to traditional ethical ideas. According to him, nothing in itself is good or bad, but only with respect to a will which strives for it or abhors it. But this is not the divine will, nor a transcendental will, nor a higher nature within us. Good is everything which our earthly will desires, evil that which it detests. The highest good is that which we most devotedly strive for; the greatest evil that which we most deeply abhor. The chief principle in Nietzsche's system of morals consists in maintaining and strengthening a lasting will within us in opposition to momentary impulses. There arises a conflict where the permanent will dictates something which the momentary impulse or momentary will objects to. Nietzsche substitutes this permanent will for the traditional ideas of duty, and where it is overridden by a passing mood we have an emotion which is substantially the same as the usually accepted ideas of guilt and sin. Repentance is the feeling aroused when our permanent will is defeated. Nietzsche's idea of contrition differs from the traditional conception in that it is not caused by the breaking of foreign commandments imposed by laws of church or state, but rather by the infraction of laws which we have imposed upon ourselves, and the feeling that we must carry through the dictates of the permanent will is not our sense of responsibility towards a Deity or any human being, but our obligation to ourselves. Moral and good is this discipline of the will; immoral and evil is its opposite.

The final aim and object of Nietzsche's will is the furthering of life, the increase of strength and fullness in our existence. This explains his nihilistic attitude towards the existing faiths of Christianity and Buddhism. They are destructive, they are misleading, they underestimate the value of life in the same way that Schopenhauer's pessimism is negative. Nietzsche's list of virtues is directly the opposite of those taught by Christianity, Buddhism and Schopenhauer.

Richter is at some pains to explain why the radical views of Nietzsche will not produce moral anarchy by doing away with all laws except those dictated by the individual. He has a difficult problem before him, but he claims that the burden of such freedom weighs far more heavily than

the commands of conventional morality. It is far simpler to follow the rules of others if one can be persuaded that they are right than it is to formulate one's own standards. Now, according to Nietzsche, it is a question not of reading in books what I shall do, but rather to find out in the unwritten book of my own consciousness what I *will*. For this purpose we need the deepest introspection and self-knowledge, and having gained this, it is a severe responsibility to live up to the self-appointed task which lies within us, and to overcome the opposing conditions of existence which surround us. Richter concludes his discussion by the statements that we may not stop with Nietzsche, but we must progress through him to higher and greater ethical ideals; that Nietzsche is the forerunner of the religion and morality of the future. The critic acknowledges that in the detailed development of his theory of morals the philosopher has frequently erred, but it is the fate of many great ideas that they must first appear in an exaggerated form in order to attract the attention of the world. Having done this, time and circumstance may chasten and correct the distortion.

Richter's final division has to do with Nietzsche's significance in the field of art. He finds that the chief esthetic problem of the philosopher was concerned not with the essence of art, but with its value. He has much to say about the kind of art that denies life, that is without substance and without will. Naturally, much that Nietzsche has written on this subject deals with the principles of Wagner, in whose works he finds the most dangerous and at the same time the most attractive embodiment of Schopenhauer's theory of resignation. Richter does not concern himself with the different phases of Nietzsche's relations with Wagner. He treats the philosopher merely in the highest, or rather the latest, stage of his development.

The really important side of Nietzsche's artistic achievement has to do rather with his direct influence upon individuals and upon the more general ideas of his time than with any special system of esthetics which he formulated or attempted to present. Much could be said about the effect of Nietzsche's personality and his theories upon contemporary artistic conceptions, but this is an extremely elusive subject and one which is not yet ripe for investigation because we are too near the period which has been affected. Nietzsche did not create new systems, but he did launch a kind of titanism, which has had a very broad sway in art.

It is unfortunate that Richter has not attempted a discussion of the influence of Nietzsche's own marvelous literary style upon his contemporaries. He mentions incidentally the names of Dehmel, Hofmannsthal and Hauptmann, but the reader might reasonably expect an ampler treatment. However, this, too, is a very elusive problem.

Kaftan, in the first part of his brochure, 'Aus der Werkstatt des Uebermenschen,' takes up the question of the lack of philosophical structure in Nietzsche's works. He says that as early as 1881 Nietzsche had in mind the preparation of a system of philosophy. This was announced on the cover of the first edition of the 'Beyond Good and Evil,' in 1886,

and it is claimed that all of Nietzsche's works from this time on had reference to the idea of a system. The second part of 'Beyond Good and Evil' is expressly called by Nietzsche a 'prelude' to 'A Philosophy of the Future.' This was to be parallel to 'Zarathustra,' without, however, its poetical character, but having a strictly philosophical and connected form. But Nietzsche was unable to complete this work. The studies he made for it which were extant were published in 1901 under the title 'Der Wille zur Macht, Versuch einer Umwerthung aller Werthe.' Kaftan states that a sketch of the work, dating from the year 1887, was found in Nietzsche's literary remains. The book as prepared by the editors is the result of much arrangement and careful collection of widely scattered material. Kaftan thinks that this posthumous work is the most important of all of Nietzsche's writings for an appreciation of the essence of his philosophy, and upon this he bases the criticism (sometimes quite destructive) which is found in the ensuing pages of his monograph. Unfortunately for his study, the foundation is not quite in order. He attacks Nietzsche for holding ideas which are studied, in many cases, out of their proper connection.

Nietzsche never had an opportunity to revise the work which his editors have published, and it is manifestly unfair on the part of Kaftan, or any other critic, to attempt an analysis of his philosophy with no basis more adequate than that of a book constructed after the author's death, out of stray notes and aphorisms. Of course, there are discrepancies, contradictions, obscurities, inaccuracies in the work written at different periods of his mental development, and it is a very simple thing for any critic to seize upon these obvious faults and to make of the great thinker a very sorry figure. Add to this the peculiarities of Nietzsche's life—his ill health, his immeasurable self-conceit, his fearful headaches and his final insanity, and it is patent that the task of the man who wishes to belittle the influence of the German reformer is a very easy one. It is unjust to attack Nietzsche as a philosopher when he never published a coherent and connected statement of his philosophical views, and it is equally unfair to assume that a posthumous work such as has already been described is a better basis for criticism than the several publications, divergent as they may be, of Nietzsche's lifetime. Here is where Kaftan makes the fundamental blunder, which vitiates much that he has to say later. He states that the present work affords a glance into Nietzsche's workshop, and permits us to see in definite outlines his philosophical structure. "I consider it doubtful," says he, "that the system would have gained through a perfection of form and style. The contrary seems to me the more probable." Further, "While Nietzsche was a master of style, he was not a master of every style, and his methods of presentation were ill suited to philosophical and systematic writing." He therefore implies that it is a fortunate thing, after all, that the philosopher did not prepare his own system, but that this was left for his more calm editors. These ideas are rather uncritical. Further, we have the inevitable reference to Nietzsche's health. Kaftan claims that as early as the middle

of the seventies Nietzsche began to fail, and on this account his writings assumed their peculiar character. He was unable to work for long periods, therefore he accustomed himself to the use of aphorisms. Also his style was too subjective for philosophical discourse. Kaftan, therefore, makes the remarkable statement, "If he had been able now in reality to work out his great work as it appeared to him, and had been able to glorify it with the splendor of his style, then probably clearness and coherence would have suffered. It is, however, different with the sketch as it lies before us. To be sure, it suffers from the deficiencies which are naturally attached to a sketch. However, what seem to be deficiencies have become on the other hand advantageous. We are now placed in a position of observing a system of Nietzsche."

Kaftan accepts in a modified form the usual division of Nietzsche's literary life into three periods. First, as a follower of Schopenhauer and friend of Wagner; second, as a positivist; third, the Zarathustra period. The last division is the most important from a philosophical and literary point of view. The least significant of the three divisions is the second. Frau Andreas, in fact, considers it merely an episode in the philosopher's life, while Kaftan makes the claim that we can speak of only one great change in Nietzsche's mental life, namely, the turning from pessimism to optimism. The so-called second period becomes lost in the third division.

According to the positivist, the real value of life consists in pure thought and perception. According to Nietzsche, the value of life lies in the will, 'the will for power,' which he announces as the only true and guiding principle. However, Nietzsche considered the ideas of his later period to have a scientific basis, and in this respect he remains a positivist. He aimed to be scientific according to his rather original conception of the word, although at all times he despised the scholarship which consists merely in the heaping up of knowledge. His attack in 'Zarathustra' upon this kind of learning constitutes one of its most famous passages.

Kaftan does not believe that his so-called second period had anything to do with his friendship with Rée. Nietzsche was not a metaphysician, and it was natural that the formal philosophical and ethical ideas of the English positivistic school were unable to hold him very long. He was interested in what might be described as more practical matters. The question of the religious, moral and esthetic life of man was uppermost in his mind. Very properly, Kaftan maintains that Nietzsche would have accomplished little had he followed in the path marked by the philosophers who had preceded him—if he had taken up their ideas and developed and expanded them.

It is one of the great things of Nietzsche's career that as his sufferings increased his optimism grew. As a young man he was a pessimist; when he was confronted by the terrible torture of his later life, he became the world's greatest optimist. Optimism is the key-note to the Zarathustra period. Man is to enjoy the actual world, and in order to see the universe

clearly he must be freed from the imaginary world of religion and metaphysics.

He finds the Christian and Buddhistic religions to be deceptive, and it is remarkable how extravagant is his hatred of these creeds. This, however, is merely one of the items in his attack upon everything which gives a false appearance to the real world. The second item is the prevailing idea of good and evil, and in this connection we have to mention one of the chief and most widely known phrases that are associated with the philosopher, namely, the expression *Herrenmoral*. This may be summed up in the expression 'might is right.' The lords of the earth must have different standards of morals from the weak. The usually accepted conceptions of ethics are then another misleading condition in our failure to see the world truthfully. Connected with religion and morality is philosophy. He finds it to be in league with religion and morality, and through this connection to have contributed also to our false vision of the world.

Nietzsche has no respect (that is to say, in his later period) for any system that does not glorify reality. The three forces, religion, morality and philosophy, have ruled long enough, but they are now bankrupt. The time is ripe for a more positive attitude towards our surrounding conditions. Decadence must come to an end, and progress, development, force, growth must take its place. Everything that thwarts this tendency, no matter how sacred it may have become through tradition and long usage, must be abandoned. There is a world of an entirely different character from that which we have known, but it can not be understood and enjoyed until the beclouding influences just mentioned have been annihilated. Nietzsche is the great nihilist, and at the same time in the rôle of Zarathustra he is the preacher of the glories of the new world, which he has made possible through his nihilism.

Kaftan now devotes a great deal of space to a rather hair-splitting and more or less dexterous discussion of the two kinds of worlds which have been mentioned. They might be described as the subjective world and the objective world. Naturally, Nietzsche's is the latter. The critic takes up the philosopher's dictum that the world is a sea of forces, and has no great difficulty in pointing out a number of inconsistencies. He finds that his ideas of the 'will for power,' of the superman, of the difference between the ethics of the lord and the ethics of the slave, do not harmonize with this representation of the world as a play of forces. He does not make his objections very clear, but it requires no great amount of dialectic power to discover that the leading motifs which Nietzsche enunciated in various periods of his life are not always logical. Kaftan insists, however, that Nietzsche must have a philosophical system, and having determined this quite against Nietzsche's own intentions, he derives a great deal of pleasure from destroying the fictitious fabric which he has created.

Nietzsche says himself, "We would not let ourselves be burnt at the stake for our opinions—but for this, namely, that we might hold them,

and might be allowed to change them." Indeed, according to him, immutable convictions are the foes of truth. Very properly, then, the writer in Heinze-Ueberweg's 'History of Philosophy' says (Vol. 4, p. 337), "One need not be surprised at contradictions with him. He need not want to form a system out of his views." This is the true attitude to assume, and the study of Kaftan is very much weakened by the point of view which he insists upon maintaining.

A final motif which Kaftan brings forward is Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal recurrence.³ Unquestionably the philosopher attaches great importance to this conception, but he was unable to develop it and expound it with the fullness which he would have liked. It is, indeed, one of the principles which he maintains most passionately, but the glorification of the world which is eternally recurring does not always rhyme with the idea of an eternally growing and developing world which we must worship and enjoy.

Nietzsche was not a philosopher; he was rather a preacher. He considered his great mission to be that of a reformer, who was to set up new standards of conduct, to teach men how to live rather than to furnish them with new metaphysical plans. Our behavior towards our neighbors, our attitude towards right and wrong, were questions of great importance with him. He wished to offer practical wisdom in teaching mankind how to know and to enjoy the actual world. Accordingly, strength is the essence of life. 'The will for power' is the key to proper development. Upon this idea hangs the gospel of Zarathustra.

In many respects, Nietzsche goes to the verge of materialism, in that he strongly emphasizes the physical. Decadence marked a physical degeneration; 'the will for power' is conditioned to a greater or less degree by vital force. The superman is to be mentally emancipated, but he also is to be physically a superman.

Nietzsche believed that humanity at the present time is decadent, that it is controlled by decadent ideals and values. Having shown this, he pronounces the thesis that 'the will for power' is to be the real test of all correct estimates of good and evil. This is the magical property which he uses in the 'transformation of values.'

The expression 'aristocratic radicalism' should be mentioned in this connection. The true aristocrat is the man whose 'will for power' is triumphant; the slave is he whose 'will for power' is weak or dormant, and it is only through combinations of the weak slaves that they have been able to defeat the real aristocrats of the world, and bring about the decadent conditions which now exist in our life and culture. Democracy is, therefore, a doctrine of slaves, who join together to thwart the progress of the aristocrats who approach most closely to Nietzsche's superman. The growth of decadence has been gradual. History has shown how supermen have been overcome. The ideal barbarians,

³ This subject has been treated recently in an essay, 'Die Ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen.' Dr. Petersen, *Beilage zur Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung*, Nummer 54 u. 55, 1907.

which the philosopher portrays, with their splendid health were able to maintain their mastery but a short time. The lords were dethroned, and gradually hordes of slaves came into control. The aristocratic rule of imperial Rome could not be maintained. The renaissance, with its heroic figures, was only an episode of short duration. The mighty Napoleon, Nietzsche's hero *par excellence*, was unable to stop the democratic course of the world.

Everywhere there has been a decline. It is now time for a steadfast preaching of a new gospel. Zarathustra, who not only brings new ideas, but creates new values, is to make an era; he can never gain a large number of disciples, for if he were surrounded by a great troupe this would be contrary to his aristocratic ideals. From the nature of the case the 'much-too-many' can not hope to attain to the high position of the lords of the earth, but through the preaching of the gospel of the superman, through the idea of natural selection, there will ultimately result a higher and a stronger race. We are not to love our fatherland, but we are to love the land of our children—the future of the race should be the goal of our ambition. The man of to-day is merely a bridge to the superman of the future. Properly speaking, then, the superman is the crowning stone in the whole fabric of Nietzsche's beliefs and teachings. He has nothing to do with philosophy, but he is the chief article in the creed which Zarathustra—Nietzsche—preaches with ecstasy.

Kaftan maintains that the superman is an addition, an unnecessary appendix, to the system of philosophy which he thrusts upon Nietzsche. He thinks that the philosopher departs widely from the teachings of science, which he claimed to follow, in creating the superman. As a matter of fact, it was just this scientific suggestion which was especially attractive to Nietzsche. He was captivated by such phrases as the 'survival of the fittest,' 'development of species,' etc., and was unquestionably brought into this course of thought by these very catchwords which were current. Kaftan, however, says, "The talk about the superman is the mere vamping of the imagination, and has nothing to do with science. More correctly expressed, no mentally sound man could think of propounding this as a result of science or as a deduction from its results."

The last division of Kaftan's paper begins with the question, "Is Nietzsche ripe for the history of philosophy?" He says we are, of course, forced to take him seriously because of his immense intellectual power, but as his system of philosophy has been demolished, the query is quite pertinent—"Does he belong in the company of philosophers?" In a previous chapter he has stated that Nietzsche is rather a preacher, but it is hardly likely that the history of theology will attempt to immortalize him, and as he will not be downed it would seem that philosophy must accept him. And it has done so, at first begrudgingly but more recently with great enthusiasm, as is evident from the very sympathetic and extensive treatment given in the 'History of Philosophy,' by Heinze-Ueberweg. So that, after all, Kaftan's inquiry whether Nietzsche belongs in the history of philosophy or not, is of very small moment. Nietzsche's creed may be

untenable; it may have no satisfactory foundation; but it has immense force, the force which appeals to clever as well as to shallow minds. And its strength consists especially in the glorification of the strong, free will. Independent personality is the highest value to be striven for. Because Nietzsche's system is not coherent and logical Kaftan can not agree with the philosopher in maintaining that Zarathustra's gospel begins a new era in the history of the world. But Kaftan, tired of his logical deductions, confesses that Nietzsche is already a great power; those who believe in him will never be turned aside through the most convincing proof of the logician, and those who are opposed to him do not need this sort of demonstration. Nietzsche, he thinks, can not have a future; everything, even the good, in his philosophy, is the product of a diseased mind, and everything is so exaggerated and pathologically perverted that the sane minds of the future will never be deluded. However this may be, there can be no doubt that much of the philosopher's mission has already been accomplished. His ideas have penetrated so deeply and so widely into German life and art and literature, that if all his work were blotted out he could not fail to have accomplished a great work.

The future may show that Nietzsche was not a sound thinker, that his ideas are pernicious, but it would be foolish to decry the great influence that they have had and are having. If his teachings are poisonous, the poison is already in the human system, and it will require many years of antidotes to counteract it. Kaftan himself says, "When the time is fulfilled, he will cease to be regarded as a prophet, and will be to all what he is to us who have never numbered ourselves among his adherents—an interesting phenomenon, a great poet, an inspired teacher, who has seen much in the world and taught others to see much." Nietzsche's saying in regard to Plato, that his system is refuted and dead, but the person behind it is irrefutable and can not be killed, applies to himself. However, Kaftan does not reckon him as a peer of Plato; still he is willing to give him a place among the minor prophets.

Kaftan takes exception to Frau Andreas's statement that Nietzsche was a religious genius, that everything but religion was secondary with him, and his misfortune was that he was unable to satisfy his intense religious need in the systems as they exist to-day. He, therefore, went so far as to deify himself, and the ecstatic exaltation which came therefrom ended in his madness. Kaftan is willing to accept this merely as the explanation of the mystical element in his teaching which was concerned with Zarathustra.

There are three ideas, the critic thinks, which explain Nietzsche's development. First, and above all, the transition from pessimism to optimism. This was the great event of his life, and it is especially important in view of the decreasing physical force of Nietzsche in proportion as his optimism increased. Kaftan finds this to be an element of moral greatness in the man who was opposed to all ideas of morality. It is indeed remarkable that Nietzsche's ideal of man seemed to be composed of many things which he did not possess himself. The superman was to be a superior

man physically. He was not to be subject to the mental and nervous tortures that had caused his creator to suffer so severely. Nietzsche's heroes were all men of action, while the philosopher's strength consisted in emotions, in ideas and in his abilities as an artist. Furthermore, his health precluded any practical ambitions. He was also a wanderer without fixed abode or profession; in short, he was the very opposite of many things that he most admired. On the other hand, his superman must also have some of the ideal qualities of Nietzsche. One of the philosopher's favorite words is the expression *instinktsicher*. This he employs in many connections to express the quality which the superman must have of accomplishing naturally and instinctively superhuman deeds. He must not only be a strong man physically, but his strength of mind and will shall be commensurate with his physical development.

The second point which Kaftan uses to explain Nietzsche's development is the unexampled egoism which animates him and everything he does. Nietzsche never made the slightest concession to popular demands; never made the smallest effort to win popularity. He considered himself so supremely superior as to feel assured that the world would eventually come to him.

The third is Nietzsche's relation to music. With this subject is very intimately connected the name of Wagner, who was of the very first importance in Nietzsche's mental and esthetic development. Kaftan is inclined to give a higher importance to the musical influence which surrounded the philosopher than is usually done. He considers that music indirectly affected not only the form of his writings, but also to some extent their substance. He even goes so far as to attempt a musical explanation of his doctrine of eternal recurrence.

Mauerhof's essay is done in an extremely shallow and flippant manner, and in such a way as to make it impossible to take the study seriously. There is a great amount of padding, so that the tangible results of his investigation might have been expressed in one fourth the space which he has employed. His first chapter is entitled 'Wagner und Nietzsche.' This promises much that is interesting and important, because Wagner means for Nietzsche a turning-point in every sense of the word, but there is little fulfillment. It is quite conceivable that many intelligent men should not approve of Nietzsche, should think his influence prejudicial to the best interests of morality and art, but no amount of vituperation and sarcasm will lessen the significance of his literary life.

The musician, Wagner, is a subject of almost as great contempt as the philosopher. Mauerhof says that we should get rid of the idea that Wagner is a dramatic poet; his literary efforts are so trivial as to remind us of the infancy of literature. There then follows a long dissection of some of Wagner's works. All this, however, is prefatory to the discussion of the inconsistencies which mark the personal relations of the musician and the philosopher. He quotes long passages written by Nietzsche at the time when he was still under the sway of the composer, and then passages illustrating what he considers to be Nietzsche's outrageous

change of front. This is a very hackneyed theme, and one that is especially attractive to the superficial critic. But there is little to be gained by continually bringing forward these inconsistencies. Let us at once accept the theory which is least favorable to the philosopher and agree that Nietzsche had outgrown the tutorship of Wagner; that he was too big a man to be willing to endure the rivalry of the musician. To be sure, his utterances after the breach were very intemperate, just as his praise before this event had been extravagant, but Nietzsche was never a dispassionate writer; his enthusiasms and animosities were always unbounded.

Nietzsche lays down the principle that Wagner is an artist of the decadence, and he considers it his duty to warn the world against this insidious power. He thinks Wagner is a sickness, and that he has made music sickly in that he has discovered the means of exciting tired nerves. Although Nordau, in his book 'Degeneration,' condemns Nietzsche in the most sweeping manner, he does not hesitate to seize upon his criticism of Wagner when he comes to write about the musician.

Nietzsche inquires, "Was Wagner after all a musician?" And he answers it by saying that he was in any case something more, namely, 'an incomparable actor, the greatest *mime*, the most astounding theatrical genius that the Germans have ever produced—our stage manager *par excellence*.' He belongs elsewhere than in the history of music. Wagner desires nothing but effects, and in order to reach them he discards musical traditions and overrides matters of taste.

Finally he inquires, "Was Wagner a German?" He finds no German traces in him except 'the ability to imitate.' He says his father was an actor by the name of Geyer, 'and a Geyer (vulture) is almost an Adler (eagle),' which is to say that Wagner was a Jew. This is hardly worthy of a philosopher of the Zarathustra stripe, although it may be witty. We shall probably never know exactly what was behind the difficulty. Only two persons now living could furnish authoritative information on this point; these are Frau Cosima Wagner and Nietzsche's sister Frau Förster-Nietzsche, and neither is likely to reveal the secret.

The next chapter of Mauerhof's essay is entitled 'The Dominating Impulse.' This refers to the fact that Nietzsche was the philosopher of personality, and it should be much more serious than Mauerhof has made it, since much of the latter-day glorification of individuality can be attributed to Nietzsche. The most recent play by Sudermann, 'Das Blumenboot,' has as its catchword just this expression 'personality,' and it does not give a pleasant idea of this phase of Nietzsche's influence, in that it shows how unfortunately the philosopher may have acted upon unripe minds and uncertain individuals.

Mauerhof takes a fling at the tendency of the students of philosophy to accept the statement that Nietzsche was the most individual thinker of all times. Such expressions as these Mauerhof thinks all started with the writer himself, who was an extremely crafty man, and knew how to furnish the world with battle-cries which would redound to his own glory.

It must be said that this is quite contrary to the usually accepted ideas, which make the philosopher out to be a recluse and afraid of the world rather than a self-seeking propagandist.

As might be expected of a critic of Mauerhof's temperament, Nietzsche's many illnesses and the mental catastrophe which finally overtook him are the subject of prolonged and rather cheap discussion.

Mauerhof says if we except the '*Die Geburt der Tragödie*,' the '*Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*,' including '*Wagner und Bayreuth*,' all his works were written in what he calls the period of his sickness.

Then follows much concerning Nietzsche's excessive vanity and egoism, from which, however, very little that is rational can be obtained. Mauerhof explains not only his attitude towards Wagner through his egoism, but even his antagonism to Christianity in the same manner. The nations had begun to assemble around Wagner, he was an international success. In the case of Christianity, Nietzsche dared to feel envious of its great power. With cruel hatred the philosopher exposed the most deeply hidden weaknesses of the musical drama. His attack upon Christianity was more passionate and more prolonged; he devoted much of his life to discovering the inconsistencies of the dogmas of the church and its abuses.

The next chapter is entitled '*Christian and Superman*.' Nietzsche had devoted six years to exploiting his friend at Bayreuth, but from this period had gained very little. After the breach he was very much at a loss to know what to do; he had little interest in philosophy, and he was disappointed in metaphysical subjects. In this frame of mind he became acquainted with Dr. Paul Rée, a young Jewish physician from West Prussia. Mauerhof lays great stress upon this relationship—a greater emphasis than is usually regarded as possible. Rée introduced him to the works of the English rationalists and the French positivists. Mauerhof even states that Nietzsche's friends were of the opinion that not he, but Rée, had written the book '*Menschliches Allzumenschliches*,' so great was the intimacy of the two men. Nietzsche entered into the philosophy of the positivists with great enthusiasm; especially was he interested in their ideas concerning the origin of moral conceptions.

Nietzsche has always been regarded as one of the most brilliant and effective writers of aphorisms who have ever lived. His pithy sayings are as concentrated and as expressive as anything that can be found in any literature, but Mauerhof wishes to deprive him even of this merit. He finds his very extensive reading to have been merely superficial, and his brilliant perceptions to have been prejudiced and untrue. He considers it a great waste of time for any one to read this part of Nietzsche's writings.

Mauerhof has demolished Nietzsche as a philosopher, as a historian of art; he now dismisses him in a very caustic manner as a moralist. He says that from despair of reaching a solution of the problem of right and wrong he eventually became insane. His great difficulty was that he was unable to base his moral teaching upon any scientific or credible founda-

tion. Concerning the philosopher's idea of eternal recurrence he says it is the 'wildest, the most insane trick that a human brain has ever been able to conceive of.' He then takes up the superman, and finds this conception to have been based upon Schopenhauer and Darwin. From the former he took the idea of the 'will to live' and transformed it into the 'will for power.' From Darwin he borrowed the theory of the development of species. Mauerhof pays his compliments to Darwin in passing, and seems to disapprove of him as strongly as he does of Nietzsche. Altogether his attitude is one of great superiority. There follows then a protracted discussion of Christianity and its history, in which he poses as a progressive in deploring the influence of the Apostle Paul; he seems to enjoy the luxury of acting as a defender of the faith, and finds that Nietzsche has taken his most important ideas from Christianity. But through his perverse attacks upon the faith of our fathers the philosopher has mystified the people into believing that he is original. He makes use of the expression 'Christian Superman' and finds that the New Testament ideal of manhood is exactly like that of Nietzsche's. They are identical with the exception that they have different aims. It would be difficult even for Mauerhof to prolong his discussion to a great length after propounding such a theory.

These three studies undertaken from three very different points of view summarize in an unusually complete manner the current criticism of the philosopher, who has probably provoked as much discussion as any German literary man in the past fifty years.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

REVUE DE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. May, 1907. *La logique et l'intuition en mathématiques* (pp. 273-283): E. BOREL. - A plea for mathematical instruction aimed rather at developing invention in application than powers of deduction. *La Vision* (pp. 284-326): N. BOY. - A long, clear and interesting, but quite elementary account of the perception of depth or distance. *La morale d'Épictète et les besoins présents de l'enseignement moral (suite)* (pp. 327-347): L. WEBER. - The sense of the world-order bred in Epictetus a free rationality, which is his chief worth (*à suivre*). *La notion du réel* (pp. 348-362): A. LÉON. - To adequate thought unreality is recognized as possibility; in all other cases the unreal is the confused. '*La théorie physique*' de M. Duhem et les *mathématiques* (pp. 363-376): P. BOUTROUX. - Very fine distinctions are here drawn leading to the conclusion that M. Duhem marks off experimental verification too sharply from mathematical analysis; and thus wrongly subordinates mathematics to physics. *La pensée catholique en France au commencement du XXe siècle* (pp. 377-400): J. WILBOIS. - An account, from a Catholic standpoint, of the 'tumultuous' movement